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I. Introduction
The United States Supreme Court has added three factors to its collection
of analytical touchstones in the realm of regulatory takings with its decision
in the case of Murr v. Wisconsin.1 As an extension of the Supreme Court’s
controversial jurisprudence on regulatory takings, this case has certainly
been subjected to its fair share of criticism. Aside from the fundamental
criticisms of Murr, the Supreme Court’s rationale poses interesting,
challenging, and uncertain consequences for Oklahoma landowners and
regulators. Before discussing the consequences of Murr, it is important to
keep some background in mind.
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution harbors many of
the rights Americans enjoy. Among the many rights contained in the Fifth
Amendment resides in what is known as the Takings Clause.2 That clause
states as follows: “nor shall private property be taken for public use without
just compensation.”3 Upon first glance, the language of the Takings Clause
indicates a negative right of the People to be protected from the government
taking their property without being justly compensated. But, underlying this
protection from the government is a power that the government itself
wields. Namely, state and federal governments have the power to take
private property so long as a citizen is justly compensated. This power is
known as eminent domain—an old, deep-rooted, and fundamental
government power. In fact, the Takings Clause’s limitation on eminent
domain is so fundamental in American jurisprudence that it was the first
part of the Bill of Rights applied to the states.4
As a general proposition, the Takings Clause involves four inquiries.5
First, a court must determine whether a taking has even occurred.6 Second,
1. 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1945 (2017).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3. Id.
4. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 667
(Wolters Kluwer 5th ed. 2015) (citing Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago, 166
U.S. 226 (1897)).
5. Id. at 668.
6. Id.
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a court must determine whether the taking involves “property” as
contemplated by the Fifth Amendment.7 Third, if the first and second
questions have been answered in the affirmative, a court must determine
whether the taking was for “public use.”8 The final question is whether
“just compensation” has been paid.9 Beyond these four questions, Takings
Clause cases consists of two principal categories: (1) “possessory” takings
and (2) “regulatory” takings.10 A “possessory” taking is “when the
government confiscates or physically occupies property,” and a
“regulatory” taking can be defined as one that “occurs when the
government’s regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of
the property.”11
The government’s eminent domain power is easily understood in the
context of a possessory or physical taking. In fact, it was originally thought
that “in the absence of explicit expropriation, a compensable ‘taking’ could
occur only through physical encroachment and occupation.”12 The Supreme
Court has broadly interpreted what constitutes a “possessory” taking. Some
common examples of this include government confiscation or occupation of
real property, confiscation of interest on an account, and even use of
airspace.13
American courts have also recognized that government action other than
a confiscation or physical occupation can constitute a taking that implicates
the Fifth Amendment. These types of government actions are the second
category of takings known as “regulatory takings.” The basic premise of a
regulatory taking is this: When a government implements a regulation, the
value of someone’s property can be adversely impacted, and the property
owner should be justly compensated for the loss in value. It is recognized
that, at some level, “any government regulation decreases the value of
someone’s property.”14 Therefore, the relevant inquiry is not whether a
government regulation does in fact negatively impact someone’s property,
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 669.
11. Id.
12. Id. (citing Frank Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1184 (1967)).
13. Id. at 669-70 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
427 (1982); Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980); United
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)).
14. Id. at 668.
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it is instead a question of at which point a government regulation impacts
the value of someone’s property in a way that would require the
government to justly compensate the property owner.15
II. Law Before the Case
A. The Supreme Court’s Approach to Regulatory Takings
To say the least, the Supreme Court’s cases on regulatory takings have
left anything but a bright-line rule to guide lower courts in their analysis.16
Instead, the Court has handed down a sampling of cases that serve as
analytical touchstones, each of which leaves lower courts with a few things
to consider. Ultimately, this leaves the courts to engage in what could
appear as an ad hoc, case-by-case analysis.17
The first landmark case that the Supreme Court decided that strayed from
the traditional physical taking framework of the Takings Clause comes by
way of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon.18 In Mahon, a homeowner sued the
Pennsylvania Coal Company, claiming that their mining operations would
“cause a subsidence of the surface and of their house” in violation of
Pennsylvania law,19 which specifically prohibited coal mining operations
that would cause subsidence.20 The Court ultimately recognized that in this
circumstance, the coal company’s ability to mine had been rendered
impracticable to the extent that the statute substantively functions in a way
that had “nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating
or destroying it.”21 Ultimately, the lesson learned from this case is that even
though the government, through the Pennsylvania law, did not physically
occupy or confiscate the mining company’s property, the statute could still
implicate the Takings Clause.22 Unfortunately, Mahon did not provide
much guidance to lower courts in terms of what exactly would qualify as a
“taking” when government action is only the implementation or
enforcement of a statute. In fact, Justice Holmes, writing for the majority,

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

See id. at 668, 675.
Id. at 669.
Id.
260 U.S. 393 (1922) [hereinafter Mahon].
Id. at 412.
Id. at 412-13.
Id. at 414.
Id. at 415.
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went so far in saying that this question is one “of degree-and therefore
cannot be disposed of by general propositions.”23
More guidance on the scope of the Fifth Amendment’s protections
against regulatory takings without just compensation comes several decades
later in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.24 In Penn
Central, the City of New York enacted a law allowing the City’s
Landmarks Preservation Commission (“Commission”) to designate
property as a “landmark” or other designation that would in turn prohibit
some types of development.25 At issue was the Commission’s designation
of Grand Central Terminal (“Terminal”) as a “landmark.”26 Consequently,
when the owners of the Terminal applied to build an office building on top
of the station, they were denied.27 Despite this denial, the Court held that
the designation did not constitute a taking as understood by the Fifth
Amendment,28 and, therefore, the owners were not entitled to
compensation.
More important than the outcome, however, is the framework by which
the Court analyzed the question of whether a taking had occurred. In that
regard, the Court identified three primary factors which play into the
decision of whether a government regulation, such as the one here,
constitutes a “taking.”29 First, the Court noted that the “economic impact of
the regulation on the claimant” should be considered.30 Second, courts
generally should consider “the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with distinct investment-backed expectations.”31 Third, courts should
consider the “character of the governmental action.”32 In addition to these
three factors, it is crucial to note that the Court goes out of its way to
identify the inherently ad hoc, fact-specific nature of analyzing
governmental actions in terms of whether something is a “taking” for Fifth
Amendment purposes. Undoubtedly, this three-factor analysis is anything
but a bright-line rule that lower courts can formulaically apply. Despite the
lack of a bright-line rule, some commentators have noted that Penn Central
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 416.
438 U.S. 104 (1978) [hereinafter Penn Central].
Id. at 109-12.
Id. at 115.
Id. at 116-17.
Id. at 135-38.
Id. at 124.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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and its progeny have not left lower courts in the dark. For example, it has
been said that these cases have “at the very least[, established that] there is
not a regulatory taking when the government’s action leaves reasonable
economically viable use of the property.”33
B. Criticisms of Penn Central, its Progeny, and the Supreme Court’s
Approach to Regulatory Takings
Unsurprisingly, one of the main criticisms of Penn Central is that it still
does not give lower courts much guidance. More poignantly, however, the
Penn Central decision and the Court’s approach to interpreting regulatory
takings has been criticized as an area of law and methodology of analysis
that is beyond the Supreme Court’s constitutional powers.34 In his article,
Schwartz identifies three primary methods of Constitutional
interpretation—all of which he claims do not support the Court’s regulatory
takings interpretation. Those methods are (1) textualism, (2) originalism,
and (3) evolutionary document theory.35
First, textualism, also referred to as strict constructionism, is defined as
“a literal, plain meaning of the terms of the Constitution.”36 It has been
argued that the text of the Fifth Amendment referring to, among other
things, “private property”37 limits takings analysis to things like
appropriation of title or physical appropriation of property through the
government’s exercise of eminent domain.38 Under this argument, the
impact of a regulation on property is plainly beyond the Fifth Amendment’s
scope.
Second, originalism is defined as going beyond textualism insofar as it is
“attempting to discern the intent of the framers or the public[’s]
understanding of constitutional text at the time it was ratified.”39 Generally,
it has been argued that the original understanding of the Takings Clause had
nothing to do with government regulation, and that it had everything to do
with the government physically occupying or taking control of an
individual’s property.40 Schwartz goes as far as to say that Justice Scalia, an
33. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, at 676.
34. E.g., Andre W. Schwartz, No Competing Theory of Constitutional Interpretation
Justifies Regulatory Takings Ideology, 34 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 247 (2015).
35. Id. at 255.
36. Id.
37. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
38. Schwartz, supra note 34, at 255-56.
39. Id. at 257.
40. Id. at 258 (citations omitted).
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adamant defender of regulatory takings has all but admitted that the framers
did not contemplate regulatory takings.41 Specifically, Schwartz noted that
Justice Scalia admitted as much in Lucas v. S.C. Costal Council,42 where he
said that before Mahon, “it was generally thought that the Takings Clause
reached only a ‘direct appropriation’ of property” and that “[e]arly
constitutional theorists did not believe the Takings Clause embraced
regulations of property at all.”43
Third, the evolutionary document theory is described as “propos[ing]
that the Constitution establishes a general framework for effective
governance of a nation destined to grow and change,” but this growth and
change is limited by the “core values embodied in the various provisions of
the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence [which] tend to
further both individual dignity and collective democratic activity.”44 There
are three primary reasons for arguing that evolutionary document theory
does not support the Court’s approach to regulatory takings: (1) it is not
supported by precedent, (2) it is contrary to the core values of the
Constitution, and (3) the Court’s concern for overbearing regulation is
overstated.45Despite academic criticism of the Court’s approach to
regulatory takings, Murr v. Wisconsin shows the Court’s willingness to
soldier on.46
III. Statement of the Case
Murr v. Wisconsin is the Supreme Court’s most recent decision
interpreting and implementing its regulatory takings jurisprudence.47
A. Facts of the Case
This case involves two adjoining lots owned by the Murr family, one of
which has a cabin built on it, and all of which rests along the St. Croix
River in Wisconsin.48 After the transfer of the parcels of land to the Murr
children, Lot F being transferred in 1994 and Lot E in 1995, they sought to
move the cabin on Lot F “to a different portion of the lot and [to] sell[] Lot

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 257-58.
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
Schwartz, supra note 34, at 258 n.34 (citations omitted).
Id. at 259-60 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Id. at 255-312.
137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
Id.
Id. at 1940.
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E to fund the project.”49 However, Wisconsin law prohibited them from
doing so because the lots unified under common ownership principles.50 A
statute unifying lots is also known as a merger provision. The Murrs
claimed that this prohibition constituted a regulatory taking, noting that the
appraised value of the lots together was approximately $70,000 less than if
they were allowed to sell the “lots as two distinct buildable
properties. . . .”51 The Circuit Court of St. Croix County granted summary
judgment in favor of the state of Wisconsin because, among other reasons,
the Murrs “had not been deprived of all economic value of their property.”52
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, and the Wisconsin
Supreme Court denied review.53
B. Issue
Turning to whether a regulatory taking had occurred here, the Court
posed a more narrow and important question: “What is the proper unit of
property against which to assess the effect of the challenged governmental
action?”54
C. Holding
The Supreme Court held that the State of Wisconsin’s action did not
constitute a regulatory taking.55
D. Decision of the Case
Because the facts in Murr technically involve more than one parcel of
land, the Court had identified the relevant parcel or parcels of land involved
before applying the three regulatory taking factors from Penn Central.
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy identified an additional three
factors for the Court to consider when determining the relevant parcel:
First, courts should give substantial weight to the treatment of
the land, in particular how it is bounded or divided, under state
and local law. . . . Second, courts must look to the physical
characteristics of the landowner’s property. . . . Third, courts

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 1941.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1941-42.
Id. at 1943.
Id. at 1949.
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should assess the value of the property under the challenged
regulation.56
The Court ultimately determined that, taken together, these three factors
tilted in favor of considering the land to be a single parcel and, as such, no
regulatory taking occurred.57
E. Potential Implications of the Decision
On top of being a significant decision in terms of an affirming the
“parcel as a whole” concept, Murr could have implications for Oklahoma’s
regulatory entities. Namely, this decision could significantly impact on the
Oklahoma Corporation Commission’s (“OCC”) efforts to regulate injection
wells in response to the increased level of earthquakes in Oklahoma.
IV. Criticisms and Commentary on the Case
One criticism of Murr is that it continues the Court’s regulatory takings
approach and failed to provide any clarity to what some perceive as a
particularly messy area of law.58 For example, it has been argued that the
Court has failed to resolve an inherent tension between a state’s ability to
“define the contours of property rights” and the federal courts’ interest in
identifying and resolving regulatory taking issues.59 In other words,
although the Court gives much deference to states to define and shape the
nature of property rights, the Court cannot give the states a “carte blanche
to regulate away all the value of private property[, and doing otherwise]
would render the protection provide by the Fifth Amendment’s Taking
Clause a dead letter.”60 This tension was reflected in Murr because of the
State’s merger provision which functionally resulted in a substantial
devaluation of the siblings’ interest, but the Court did not find that a
regulatory taking occurred because of the merger provision.61 Instead of
solely deferring to state property law or holding “that property rights are not
so malleable that the state can erase them simply because title changes
hands,” like in the case of the Murrs, it is argued that the Court

56. Id. at 1945-46.
57. Id. at 1948-50.
58. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, From a Muddle to a Mudslide: Murr v. Wisconsin, Cato
Sup. Ct. Rev., 2016-2017 (2017) [hereinafter Garnett].
59. Id. at 132.
60. Id.
61. Id.
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unnecessarily complicated things.62 The Court turned regulatory taking law
from a “muddle” to a “mudslide” because it “articulate[d] a multifactor
balancing test that seeks, for the first time, to define ‘property’ as a matter
of federal constitutional law.”63
It is argued that this “mudslide” is problematic for a couple of reasons.
First, when read in conjunction with the Court’s holding in Lucas,64 which
indicates that a plaintiff will be more successful if they can prove a “total
taking,” Murr now incentivizes landowners to “define the relevant ‘private
property’ narrowly [which] threatens the careful balance between property
rights and government authority that our regulatory takings doctrine
strikes . . . .”65 Now, courts generally have a default position in not finding
a taking where a plaintiff’s property has not been completely taken. Surely,
though, finding no taking should not be the outcome in a takings case when
a person’s property has been substantially devalued by a government
regulation. The second reason it is argued that this “mudslide” is
problematic is the fact that the Court had never before addressed the
question of what the relevant parcel is in the context of a regulatory takings
action where the State changed the parcel’s boundaries through a merger
provision.66 This is problematic because it departs from an existing
guidepost in the regulatory takings muddle—underlying state law.67 Federal
courts fundamentally defer to state law on issues concerning the contours
and definitions of property interests.68 That question, however, is now a
subjective and potentially cumbersome analytical hurdle federal courts will
now have to address which “decidedly tips the scales in favor of the
government, further undermining the Takings Clause’s already limited
protection against regulatory excess.”69
Similar to the “mudslide” issue, Murr’s critics also argue that the Court’s
decision endangers the concept of “property federalism.” 70 This criticism
62. Id. at 133.
63. Id. For further discussion on the confusion Murr v. Wisconsin creates for the
Supreme Court’s approach to regulatory takings cases, see generally Lynn E. Blais, The
Total Takings Myth, 86 Fordham L. Rev. 47 (2017).
64. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
65. Garnett, supra note 58, at 138 (citing Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1952 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting)).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 139.
68. See id.
69. Id.
70. See Maureen E. Brady, Penn Central Squared: What the Many Factors of Murr v.
Wisconsin Mean for Property Federalism, U. Pa. L. Rev. Online 53, 55-56 (2017).
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rests on the concept that “the Constitution protects different interests in
different jurisdictions, depending on the content of state-specific law.”71 For
example, despite the traditional divide between the scope of federal and
state protections, Brady argues that the first factor of Murr, which “invites
courts to examine the treatment of property under ‘reasonable’ state and
local law” does nothing more than inject other states’ concepts of property
law into a different state.72
Furthermore, another criticism of Murr, like those described by Garnett,
is that Murr unnecessarily complicates regulatory takings law. At the core
of that argument is this: Murr failed to return takings law to first
principles.73 The alleged departure from first principles stems from the
Court’s interpretations of the takings clause in cases like Mahon and Penn
Central because those cases completely lack “any textual foundation in the
takings clause.”74 According to Epstein, these cases are not sufficiently
grounded in the text because they go too far beyond physical takings, which
he argues is problematic because it “systematically encourage[s] the
government to impose regulations with public benefits that are less than
private costs imposed on the landowner.”75
To correct the problem that the Court created with its regulatory takings
approach, Epstein proposes a new, comprehensive test for the Court to
adopt for its Takings Clause cases.76 That test comprises of four questions
to be addressed in chronological order:
First, has there been a taking of private property? Second, if so,
is it justified under the police power so that no compensation
need be paid? Third, if not, has the taking been for a public use?
Fourth, if so, has compensation, be it in cash or in-kind, been
provided?77
In support of this four-question approach, Epstein alludes to Justice
Roberts’ dissent in Murr where the Chief Justice claimed that the recurring

71. Id. at 56 (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 66.
73. Richard A. Epstein, Disappointed Expectations: How the Supreme Court Failed to
Clean Up Takings Law in Murr v. Wisconsin, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 151, 183-84 (2017).
74. Id. at 193.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 194.
77. Id.
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focus of the Supreme Court’s Takings Clause cases is on private property
rights.78
Epstein goes further in his argument favoring a physical property
focused Takings Clause by noting the difference in analysis between
physical and regulatory takings in the compensation portion of the analysis.
Unlike the regulatory taking context, Epstein notes that the compensation
calculation for physical takings “does not include ‘any supposed benefit
that the owner may receive common with all from the public uses to which
his private property is appropriated.”79 Valuing such benefits would pose a
heavy burden on the condemnation system and it is unnecessary in the
physical taking context because the person from whom the government is
taking may also enjoy the public benefit of that taking.80 On the other hand,
the valuation analysis for the compensation portion of the Takings Clause
becomes a more difficult question because “compensation is not needed
when [the regulations] in question [secure] ‘an average reciprocity of
advantage’ among all the relevant players.”81 Because this ‘balancing’ of
costs and benefits to those being regulated, cash compensation would be
less likely and, therefore, the government would be more inclined to engage
in regulatory takings—the avoidance of which Epstein urges.82
V. Defense of the Court’s Regulatory Takings Approach
A substantial portion of the literature responding to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Murr and previous regulatory takings cases is negative.
However, completely abandoning the principles underlying the Court’s
current regulatory takings approach for a physical-taking approach would
be inconsistent with the Court’s jurisprudence. Simply put, the basic
premise that the Takings Clause applies to situations where governmental
regulation negatively impacts the value of property should remain. In fact,
Murr presents a great example of why this premise should remain true.
Opponents to the Court’s regulatory takings approach claim that the
purpose of the Takings Clause is to protect against physical takings only.
However, there is a problem with arguments like these and like those
proffered by Epstein: Although the regulation in Murr is indeed just that, a
78. Id. (citing Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Our decisions have,
time and again, declared that the Takings Clause Protects private property rights as state law
creates and defines them.”)).
79. Id. (citing Monogahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893)).
80. Id. at 198-99.
81. Id. at 199 (citing Pa. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)).
82. Id.
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regulation, limiting the Takings Clause ignores tangible consequences
suffered by landowners that are tantamount to a physical taking.
Here, Justice Kennedy found that no compensable regulatory taking
occurred, but a different outcome in a different case is just as plausible
under the Court’s framework for identifying the relevant parcel. Indeed,
Uncle Sam did not overtly commandeer the Murr’s property, but his
intrusion was no less intimate. Just as if Wisconsin had annexed one of the
lots the Murr’s owned, the merger provision prohibited them from moving
the cabin in the way in which they wanted.83 Wisconsin has functionally
removed one of the sticks in the Murr’s bundle of rights as a matter of
federal constitutional law. For that, and for the accompanying decrease in
property value, they should be compensated if a court determined that the
impact on their property value was greater than it was here. Such an
outcome is nothing more than a reflection of the progression of property
law in this country—we have moved towards recognizing increasingly
abstract notions of what property is. Therefore, because the Court’s
framework provides for the possibility of a regulatory taking being found in
a different case, the decision should stand. Even though the Supreme Court
correctly adheres to its earlier regulatory takings approach, Murr presents
some interesting challenges for Oklahoma energy regulation entities and
property owners.
VI. The Oklahoma Corporation Commission (OCC)
A. OCC General Authority
Broadly speaking, the OCC has exclusive jurisdiction over promulgating
and enforcing regulation over Oklahoma’s oil and gas industry. 84
Specifically, the OCC enjoys the following jurisdiction, powers, and
authority:
The Corporation Commission is vested with exclusive
jurisdiction, power and authority, and it shall be its duty, to make
and enforce such rules and orders governing and regulating the
handling, storage and disposition of saltwater, mineral brines,
waste oil and other deleterious substances produced from or
obtained or used in connection with the drilling, development,
producing and operating of oil and gas wells and brine wells
within the state as are reasonable and necessary for the purpose
83. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1941.
84. See generally Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 52, § 139 (West 2017).
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of preventing the pollution of the surface and subsurface waters
in the state, and to otherwise carry out the purpose of this act.85
It is also worth noting that the Commission’s authority under § 139
specifically includes governance over injection wells.86 Under a plain
reading of this statutory authority, the OCC should be considered the “state
actor” regarding its rules and directives, especially those pertaining to
injection wells and earthquakes.87
B. OCC and the Courts
In addition to the quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial authority delegated
to the OCC, federal courts have deferred to it in litigation matters, including
those arising out of disposal well operations.88 One recent example of a
federal court deferring to the commission comes by way of a case where an
interest group sued disposal well operators for declaratory and injunctive
relief, claiming that the increased number of earthquakes occurring in
Oklahoma was caused by the operators.89 Because of the OCC’s expertise
and specialization on such matters—and not the district court’s expertise—
the court dismissed the action.90
The OCC’s authority to step in as a quasi-judicial entity is, however,
limited in one important respect—its ability to preside over tort litigation.
During an earthquake in 2011, a claimant said that she was injured when
some debris fell from the fireplace in her living room.91 The claimant filed a
tort action for damages against injection well operators in the Lincoln
County Oklahoma District Court; she claimed that because of the operators’
actions, an earthquake caused her injuries.92 The operators claimed the suit

85. Id. § 139(A).
86. Id. § 139(B)(1)(d)-(f).
87. Id. § 139.
88. See Sierra Club v. Chesapeake Operating, LLC, 248 F. Supp. 3d 1194 (W.D. Okla.
Apr. 4, 2017); Adam Wilmoth, Lawsuit dismissed over Oklahoma earthquakes, THE
OKLAHOMAN, (Apr. 5, 2017, 12:00 AM), http://newsok.com/article/5544276.
89. Sierra Club, 248 F. Supp. 3d at 1198.
90. Id. at 1207 (“The short of the matter is that the OCC, aided, if necessary, by other
agencies (including the United States Geological Survey and Oklahoma Geological Survey)
and researchers, is better equipped than the court to resolve the seismicity issues relating to
disposal well activities, ‘by specialization, by insight gained through experience, and by
more flexible procedure.’”) (citing Far E. Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 575
(1952)).
91. Ladra v. New Dominion, LLC, 353 P.3d 529, 530 (Okla. 2015).
92. Id.
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should be dismissed because the OCC had exclusive jurisdiction over cases
“concerning oil and gas operations.”93
On appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court acknowledged the OCC’s
exclusive jurisdiction over “the exploration, drilling, development,
production and operation of wells used in connection with the recovery,
injection or disposal of mineral brines.”94 Despite this statutory
authorization of exclusive jurisdiction over certain matters, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court duly noted that the OCC’s jurisdiction does not include
“authority to hear and determine disputes between two or more private
persons or entities in which the public interest is not involved.”95
Therefore, while Oklahoma district courts may not impede “upon the
orders, rules and regulations”96 of the OCC, state district courts are
inherently the appropriate venues in which to bring tort cases such as the
one brought in Lincoln County.97 Further still, it is beyond the OCC’s
jurisdiction to hear such tort cases.98 In other words, while regulation of the
oil and gas industry is the OCC’s “turf,” litigating and providing remedies
for common law rights are the province of state district courts.99
C. OCC Oil and Gas Regulations
Acting under its broad authority, the OCC has issued a directive aimed
specifically at the relationship between injection wells and increased
earthquake activity in the state. Specifically, the Commission identified an
“Earthquake Area of Interest” and intended to limit “the growth in future
disposal rates” in this area.100 Following such directives, the OCC claims
that the number of earthquakes has decreased.101 The OCC’s efforts to
reduce earthquake activity has gone beyond focusing on disposal to

93. Id.
94. Id. (citing Okla. Stat. tit. 17, § 52 (2011)).
95. Id. (citing Rogers v. Quiktrip Corp., 230 P.3d 853, 857 (Okla. 2010) (footnote
omitted)).
96. Okla. Stat. tit. 52, § 111 (2011).
97. Ladra, 353 P.3d at 531.
98. Id. at 532 (citing Kingwood Oil Co. v. Hall-Jones Oil Corp., 396 P.2d 510, 512
(Okla. 1964)).
99. Id. (citing NBI Servs., Inc. v. Ward, 132 P.3d 619, 626 (Okla. Civ. App. 2006)).
100. OKLA. CORP. COMM’N, LOOKING AHEAD: NEW EARTHQUAKE DIRECTIVE TAKES AIM
AT FUTURE DISPOSAL RATES 1 (2017), http://www.occeweb.com/News/2017/02-2417%20FUTURE%20DISPOSAL.pdf.
101. Id.
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activities like well completion operations;102 it now claims that mitigation
efforts regarding well completion operations have also had an impact on
earthquake activity. In support of the OCC’s migratory efforts, Dr. Jeremy
Boak, Director of the Oklahoma Geological Survey claimed that where
these mitigation efforts have taken place, “earthquake activity either
stopped quickly or tapered off and stopped soon after” the directive was
implemented.103
VII. Injection Well Regulation Under Murr’s “Parcel-as-a-whole”
Framework and the Courts’ General Approach to Regulatory Takings.
A. Background
Continuing its trend of addressing the earthquake problem, the OCC has,
for example, expanded its injection well volume reductions as of August
2017 to three wells in the Edmond area by ninety-five percent of their
current injection.104 It is unclear, and probably unlikely, that the Murr court
contemplated the unique factual circumstances presented by injection well
regulations. However, it appears that the “parcel as a whole” analysis would
apply should a regulatory taking issue emerge. Having said that, one unique
issue arises when considering well disposal regulation by the OCC because
of the way it appears that the regulation measures who and what it will
affect. For example, it appears that the Commission measures the area
which injection will be reduced by the radius around the area where
earthquake activity has been located.105
To more fully understand the issue posed by relying on the radius from a
point at which an earthquake emanates, some background information on
how injection wells work and are regulated is instructive. It is first worth
mentioning that focusing on injection wells is appropriate because the
OCC’s preliminary evidence indicates that seismicity linked to deep
injection—as opposed to well completion—is “more numerous and often
[involves] far larger quakes.”106 As for the wells themselves, an “injection
102. Press Release, Oklahoma Corporation Commission, Managing Risk: OGS, OCC,
Industry collaboration bears fruit, 1-2 (June 27, 2017), available at
https://earthquakes.ok.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/06-27-17-OCC_OGS-NewsRelease.pdf [hereinafter OCC Press Release].
103. Id.
104. OKLA. CORP. COMM’N, MEDIA ADVISORY – FURTHER REDUCTION IN EDMOND
DISPOSAL WELL VOLUMES, http://earthquakes.ok.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/08-0917ADVISORY.pdf.
105. Id.
106. See OCC Press Release, supra note 102, at 1.
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well” for purposes of this note will refer to several things. First, this note
focuses primarily on the OCC’s regulation of injection wells described in
Title 52, section 139(B)(1) of the Oklahoma Statutes. Commonly, these
injection wells are known as “Class II Wells.”107 A Class II Well is simply
an injection well108 that is related to Oil and Gas, but Class II wells are
divided into three main types: (1) disposal wells, (2) enhanced recovery
wells, and (3) hydrocarbon storage wells.109 First, disposal wells reinject
brines that previously brought to the surface during normal oil and gas
extraction.110 Also included in the disposal well category are those that
involve wastewater injections associated with hydraulic fracturing.111
Second, enhanced recovery wells are those wells that inject fluids into
formations to recover oil.112 Third, hydrocarbon storage wells, as the name
might indicate, store liquid hydrocarbons in underground formations.113
Although there are several different “types” of injection wells, the
Commission’s regulations and directives regarding these wells in its effort
to combat earthquakes appear unified by one thing—the radius from a point
which earthquakes linked to injection well operations originate. Because
Murr offers a new approach and a new balancing test to our understanding
of “property” and relevant parcels in terms of the Takings Clause, several
questions remain unanswered when considering the OCC’s regulatory
approach to injection wells as preventative measures against earthquake
activity. For example, is the use of the radius from an earthquake’s location
a “reasonable expectation[] [that] an acquirer of land must acknowledge” in
terms of expecting “legitimate restrictions affecting his or her subsequent
use and dispensation of the property” when selecting a site for an injection
well?114 Moreover, do the other two Murr factors “fit” squarely with the
OCC’s “radius approach” to regulating injection wells? The fact that the
“radius approach” fails to specifically address parcels owned by more than
107. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 52, § 139(B)(1)(f) (West 2017).
108. Defined as “A bored, drilled, or driven shaft whose depth is greater than the larges
surface dimension; or, a dug hole whose depth is greater than the largest surface dimension;
or, an improved sinkhole; or, a subsurface fluid distribution system.” 40 C.F.R. § 144.3
(2011).
109. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Underground Injection Control (UIC): Class II Oil and Gas
Related Injection Wells, EPA.GOV, http://www.epa.gov/uic/class-ii-oil-and-gas-relatedinjection-wells (last visited Mar. 24, 2018).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945.
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one landowner complicates this question. It is doubtful that the Court in
Murr contemplated these questions, so future litigation regarding this issue
is quite unpredictable.
B. Application of Murr’s Parcel-as-a-whole Concept
The newly adopted, federal approach to the parcel-as-a-whole concept
presents a unique problem in the injection well context. To demonstrate the
problem, suppose the following: An individual owns a rather large piece of
land in Oklahoma that consists of more than one contiguous parcel, and the
landowner uses it for different purposes. In this case, if the OCC
implements a regulation prohibiting the use of injection wells on part of the
parcel, and the landowner described has an injection well on only one small
portion of one of the parcels due to the topography, usage, or some other
limitation of the land, the landowner could be effectively prohibited from
placing injection wells on all of her property. A scenario like this is
arguably already within the Court’s contemplations in Murr, but the fact
that the Murrs did not prevail would give the above described landowner
cause for concern that an OCC regulation may completely bar her from
using injection wells on her parcels.115
Consider another example: A landowner has a small business operation
which happens to have one injection well on the property. If the injection
well is the only thing keeping the business operation viable and the OCC
prohibits injection wells in that location, the business owner cannot say
with any certainty that they are protected by Murr. Murr is, instead,
concerned with the change in the overall value of the property, not whether
someone’s business fails because of regulation. Alternatively, suppose the
worst. Even entertaining the idea of a situation where the OCC prohibits
injection wells and all other oil and gas operations on all a landowner’s
property, the consequence of Murr is that the inevitable decrease in
property value will be valued against the entire property’s value. This
calculation does not appear to change even though the landowner’s mineral
rights have been all but taken away. Admittedly, these would extreme and
rare examples, but they demonstrate how flexible Murr allows a court’s
judgment to be in terms of whether a taking has occurred.
Another consequence of adopting the parcel-as-a-whole concept is that it
appears to place a new burden of expectation on landowners. The question
115. To be sure, Murr is a bit different than this example because of the State merger
provision, but the outcome in the case appears to indicate that landowners now have a harder
time proving a regulatory taking has occurred.
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that arises here is this: When the Court says in Murr that the “reasonable
expectations of an acquirer of land [regarding] restrictions affecting his or
her subsequent use”116 of that land must be considered when determining
the parcel relevant for takings analysis, what is a “reasonable expectation?”
Further, is it really appropriate for a federal court—rather than a state
legislature—to tell landowners what they should reasonably expect to
encounter as a landowner?
Given the media coverage of earthquakes, fracking, and injection wells
in Oklahoma, must a landowner now reasonably expect that their land will
be regulated by the OCC for that purpose? If so, does such an expectation
change the way OCC would value property in its compensation calculation?
All these questions are unanswered by the court in Murr, thus leaving
landowners and regulators with an uncertain future.
Notably, these complications are unlikely to be resolved in favor of
landowners. Analogously, even before Murr, oil and gas operators engaging
in hydraulic fracturing were unlikely to prevail in takings cases when
regulators did not place complete bans on the practice.117 Importantly, it
does not appear that placing a total ban on injection well operations is a
strategy the OCC has taken yet. This, combined with Oklahoma federal
courts’ deference to the OCC on regulatory matters, signals a challenge for
Oklahoma landowners in the wake of Murr. Further still, the fact that the
Supreme Court has now adopted the parcel-as-a-whole concept clouds any
predictive analysis previously available to landowners thinking about suing
the OCC.
VIII. Conclusion
To the extent that the Supreme Court adhered to fundamental principles
underlying earlier Takings Clause cases, the Court correctly decided Murr.
However, adding another multi-factor test to the equation while
functionally adopting the parcel-as-a-whole concept as a matter of federal
constitutional law will add complications for Oklahoma landowners.
Whether the OCC will use Murr as a tool to regulate away injection wells
to combat seismic activity is yet to be seen. Ultimately, if the OCC does

116. Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 1945.
117. See Mark S. Barron, Constitutional Protections for Mineral Interst Holders: Oil and
Gas Regulation and the Takings Clause, 61 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 13-1 (2015), available
at http://www.bakerlaw.com/files/uploads/Documents/News/Articles/LITIGATION/2016/
Energy/Barron-Ch-13-01-19-2016.pdf.
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increase such regulations, landowners who choose to bring a regulatory
takings case to federal court in Oklahoma face an uphill battle.
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